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Early in 1992, the British tabloid press launched a barrage of insults 
against our Prime Minister for daring to declare that Britain's 
behaviour towards Australia during the Second World War might have 
been less than perfect. As the fall of Singapore was being 
commemorated, Paul Keating had the audacity to suggest that Britain 
was the country which decided not to defend the Malayan peninsula, 
not to worry about Singapore and not to give us our troops back to 
keep ourselves free from Japanese domination. 
Ironically, when I made the self-same suggestions during an 
Australian Historical Association conference in 1988, an historian in 
the audience asked at the completion of what I had thought to be 
a new and challenging paper — 'what's new about that?' 'Everyone 
knows that Britain let Australia down.' And I suppose he was right 
to some extent. 
Folk wisdom, particularly Irish-AustraUan folk wisdom, has long 
told the multi-chapter tale of British perfidiousness in which the events 
of the Second World War merely rate one chapter, following on from 
chapters on the original convict colonisation, the economic 
exploitation of Australia, the events at Gallipoli and, of course, the 
tragic litany of events in Ireland itself. So the idea of British 
exploitation of Australia, of British betrayal, is not a new one. 
Moreover, as my 1988 critic observed, people at the time — that 
is, in 1942 — were not reluctant to criticise Britain for the fall of 
Singapore and its consequent effect on Australian security. In fact, 
so virulent was this criticism that the Archbishop of Brisbane, the 
Most Reverend J. Wand, was moved to pubhsh a strong defence of 
Britain's behaviour. 
Titled, 'Has Britain Let Us Down?', and reprinted several times 
during 1942 by Oxford University Press, the good archbishop's booklet 
made a stout defence of Britain's war effort during which he blasted 
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any criticism as being akin to 'Fifth Column activity'. According to 
Wand, it was Churchill who had first suggested sending most of the 
AIF home to Australia to meet the Japanese threat. And the fault 
for the fall of Singapore, suggested Wand, should be laid at Australia's 
door, rather than Britain's. It was Australia which had demanded that 
the embattled troops of Singapore not be evacuated when there still 
time to do so. And it was the Australian sector of the Singapore 
defences that fell first to the Japanese and led to the subsequent fall 
of the entire garrison. 
Wand concludes his defence of Britain's war effort with an attack 
on those Australians who 'would willingly stab Britain in the back' 
and calls for his fellow loyalists to make clear that Australia will 
remain, 'come weal or come woe, as for ever a British people'. 
How does the historian make sense of these apparently diametrically 
opposed views on the war? Well, as you are well aware, many historians 
rushed into newsprint with judgements on the Prime Minister's 
statements early in 1992, both for and against. Some of Keating's 
opponents repeated the good Archbishop's arguments almost word 
for word. As is the nature of such arguments, there was much heat 
and fire and very little light. Many of the judgements were wrong, 
not only in their interpretations of the events but in the so-called facts 
they sought to use in support of them. 
It would be impossible in the space available to detail the case 
regarding Britain's treatment of Australia. I would, however, refer 
those interested in the details to my two books on the subject — Great 
Betrayal and Reluctant Nation — both of which are being released 
in paperback, ironically by the archbishop's publisher, Oxford 
University Press. 
Put briefly, the archbishop was correct to claim that it was Churchill 
rather than Curtin who initiated the return of the Australian troops 
from the Middle East. However, that is less than half the story. For 
Churchill never intended that the Australian troops should return to 
Australia, only to the eastern theatre. Their destination changed with 
each victory by the Japanese, and each time the destination shifted 
further rather than closer to Australia. At various times, Churchill 
intended that the Australians go to Singapore, Sumatra, Burma or 
India — almost anywhere but Australia. 
It was Australian Prime Minister John Curtin who insisted that the 
Australians return home rather than be diverted to the hopeless 
defence of Burma. It was this insistence by Curtin that ensured the 
troops would be available for the all-important, at least to Australia, 
battles in New Guinea. At the same time, it was Curtin, uncertain 
in his nationalist feelings, who allowed some of these troops to be 
diverted to Ceylon, which was really just as indefensible as Burma. 
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Churchill's supposed concern for the defence of Australia was further 
belied by his strenuous refusal throughout most of 1942 to return the 
last of Australia's three Middle Eastern divisions — the 9th Division 
which won glory for itself at El Alamein. And when Churchill finally 
conceded at the end of 1942, the troops were forced to return in a 
convoy without adequate naval protection and at grave risk to their 
safety across the wide reaches of the Indian Ocean and within striking 
distance of Japanese naval and air forces at Singapore. 
Even more important than the denial of her troops, Australia was 
deprived by Britain of the modern aircraft, tanks and other weapons 
of war that would have ensured Austraha remaining inviolate. When 
war came to the Pacific in December 1941, Australia was left as 
unprepared as it is possible to imagine. There were no tanks, no fighter 
aircraft worthy of the name and no heavy bombers. Had a Japanese 
invasion force landed in Austraha in early 1942, a swift victory would 
have been assured to the forces of Emperor Hirohito. 
Who was responsible for this lamentable state of affairs? The first 
thing to be said is that not all the blame can be laid at the door of 
Downing Street. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Australia was 
content to believe in the British assurances about the invincibility of 
Britain's Singapore naval base and its ability to prevent any Japanese 
invasion force reaching Australia. 
The Australian Prime Minister, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 
established in 1923 the attitude that would be followed by his 
successors for eighteen years, almost until the sorry fall of Singapore 
itself. While attending an Imperial conference in London, Bruce had 
asked the obvious question — how much reliance could Australia place 
upon the British defence guarantee in the event of a simultaneous 
threat in Europe? How could the ships of the Royal Navy steam to 
Singapore if they faced a concurrent challenge in the Mediterranean 
or the North Sea? 
Like his successors, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Leo Amery, 
trotted out a reassuring commitment of British fidelity to the quizzical 
Australian. Although Bruce seemed to sense that Amery had his 
fingers crossed when making the commitment, he expressed his 
satisfaction nonetheless. Although claiming to be 'not quite as clear 
as I should like to be as to how the protection of Singapore is to be 
assured, I am clear on this point, that apparently it can be done'. Such 
vague generalities underpinned Australian defence throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, tying her firmly to the system of imperial defence 
and precluding a prudent concentration on the local defence of the 
Australian continent. 
Of course, in the context of the 1920s and early 1930s, the British 
guarantee would have seemed iron-clad. There was no credible threat 
to British power and the infectious talk of peace and disarmament 
seemed to preclude any serious threat developing. 
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Such an optimistic outlook was not justified in 1939. And yet the 
same British assurances were trotted out for Dominion consumption 
and just as eagerly gobbled up by gulhble Austrahans. This time the 
British promise was made by the new First Lord of the Admiralty, 
Winston Churchill, for the express purpose of extracting from 
Austraha a commitment of troops for Britain's imperial purposes. 
The terms of his promise committed Britain to abandon the 
Mediterranean and dispatch a fleet to the Far East in the event of 
a large-scale invasion of Australia. When his Cabinet colleagues jibbed 
at such a commitment, Churchill pointed out that it was, in fact, 
vaguer than previous British commitments and was made with the 
sole aim of reassuring the Dominions 'so that they would consent 
to the dispatch of their forces'. 
Churchill was planning a war along the lines of the First World 
War and was anxious to accumulate the maximum amount of 
manpower to fill the trenches of France. This pressing need would 
have encouraged him to be 'economical with the truth' in his dealings 
with the Dominions. He would also have taken comfort from the 
French fleet, which provided an important addition to British naval 
power, and by the continued neutrality of Italy. Churchill also seemed 
to have believed that Australia was beyond the power of Japan to 
invade. 
So far, so good. Australian army and naval forces, together with 
air force trainees, streamed out of Australia to buttress Britain's effort 
against Germany while the local defence of Austraha took second 
place to British needs. Even the battle of Britain in 1940 failed to 
deflect the Australian government from its discredited course. France 
was knocked out of the war, Italy had stormed in and Japan was 
skulking around the edges as it sought an opportune moment to seize 
European colonies in Asia and the Pacific. 
It was in these alarming circumstances that the Australian Prime 
Minister, the young Robert Menzies, flew off to London in early 1941 
to get a renewed guarantee from Winston Churchill who had since 
been thrust into Downing Street. Once again, Churchill was most 
forthcoming with promises of future assistance in the event of a 
Japanese invasion of Australia while withholding any practical 
assistance that might have deterred such an invasion. More Australian 
forces flowed out of Australia to shore up Britain's embattled positions 
around the world. 
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the invasion of 
Malaya, the new Labor government of John Curtin tried to pressure 
Churchill into making good on Britain's promises. It was then that 
the fine print was pointed out — that any abandonment of the 
Mediterranean and dispatch of naval forces to Singapore would 
depend upon an invasion in force of Australia. But, of course, that 
would in all likelihood be too late to avert an Australian capitulation. 
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So Singapore was allowed to fall and Australia forced to endure 
the most dangerous months of its relatively short existence. On 
Australia Day 1942, as Australians watched the Japanese prepare to 
launch their final assault on Singapore Island, a Brirish Cabinet 
Minister grabbed a thick blue crayon to scribble a note to his colleague 
across the table in Downing Street. 'Send more ships to Singapore' 
might have been his message; or perhaps, a note to inquire about 
Austraha's defences; or a suggestion to release the 9th Division from 
the Middle East. But no. Instead of these wild fancies, this Minister 
scrawled in exasperation: 'Australia is the most dangerous obstacle 
facing this govt'. 
Those few words encapsulate the brutal reality of Anglo-Australian 
relations during the Second World War. Australia was a dangerous 
diversion to a British government concentrating its resources on higher 
priorities than the distant and embattled dominion. Despite the 
assurances of Churchill and his predecessors, the Mediterranean 
remained a higher priority than the Far East. And for good reasons, 
at least as far as British national interests were concerned. 
British control of the Mediterranean was the key to continued 
British influence in the countries of southern Europe right round 
through Turkey to the oil-rich states of the Middle East. These were 
prizes that could not be lightly passed by for the sake of defending 
a quarrelsome Dominion. Anyway, as Churchill apparently assured 
Australia's foreign minister, Dr Evatt, Britain would have recaptured 
a conquered Australia from Japan once the war with Germany was 
won. 
Faced with the choice of allocating scarce resources between the 
Mediterranean and the Far East, it was perhaps inevitable that Britain 
would choose the former and thereby renege on her historic defence 
commitment to Australia. It was not that Britain did not care about 
Australia's fate; it was simply that she did not care enough. So the 
answer to the rhetorical question posed by the Brisbane Archbishop 
half a century ago — Has Britain let us down? — is a most decided 
yes. And the lesson for Australia is the self-evident one — not to trust 
her defence to anyone but herself. 
